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Abstract 
With growing US protectionism and uncertainties in the transatlantic relationship it is time 
for the EU to consider diversifying its external ties and look for other allies that support the 
idea of free trade gains and have a common interest in maintaining the international rules-
based trading system. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which shares a common 
neighbourhood and is a crucial supplier of raw materials interested in getting technology 
transfer represents a natural trading partner of the EU. While there are currently no political 
(sanctions against Russia) and legal (Belarus is not yet a WTO member) preconditions for 
starting free trade negotiations, given the high economic significance and positive security 
implications such a possibility should be considered. This paper undertakes a comprehensive 
assessment of the potential welfare effects of a possible future EU-EEU FTA based on the 
Sussex Framework. Such an analysis provides important information on bilateral trade 
patterns and insights on the economic implications that would be useful once sanctions are 
removed and bilateral trade relations normalized. The results show that in the long term the 
aim should be a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement that goes beyond mere 
removal of trade barriers which could however be a feasible first step.  
 
Keywords: free trade agreements, Eurasian Economic Union, EU, trade indicators, Sussex 
Framework. 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
Although Europe has been able to rely on the US for the last 70 years 
nowadays the new Trump administration seems to be drawing back from  
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globalization and liberal values making the EU no longer be certain that the US 
will support the multilateral order. Springford and Odendahl (2017) stress that 
Trump does not understand international trade, does not like bodies such as the 
World Trade Organization and, consequently, his administration may 
undermine the multilateral organizations.
1
  
On the other hand, the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 
anaemic economic growth after it, Brexit in 2016, failure to control irregular 
migration from the Middle East and North Africa, the situation in Ukraine and 
the sanction war with Russia, populist parties that want to destroy the EU 
project have jointly seriously challenged the EU’s economic stability and 
internal unity. In such situation the EU not only did devaluate its position as a 
strategic partner for third countries but even inside the Union more and more 
people began questioning whether the process of globalization and economic 
liberalization were delivering benefits to them.  
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (the ambitious project of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy), established in 2008 with a view to “create stability, 
good governance and economic prosperity for its participants has been a ‘near-
total failure’ ”
2
 especially for EU-Russian relations. In this regard, Trenin 
(2014) argues that it was the EU’s Eastern Partnership that was at the origin of 
the Ukraine crisis.
3
 DeBardeleben (2011) highlights that this initiative was 
formulated unilaterally by the EU where Russia was an object of the policy 
rather than co-author of a joint strategy to stabilize the EU’s new eastern 
frontier.
4
 Moreover, Russia was unhappy about being put in the same category 
as countries clearly having less power and status in the region. It is worth 
mentioning that both Russia and China found this initiative against their 
interests and tried to propose alternative projects to shape the countries around 
them challenging Western models of economic and political integration. One 
such project is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) led by Russia and 
established in 2015 that besides Russia encompasses Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the EEU is economically weak 
especially due to the hard economic situation in Russia. Another regional 
project in Eurasia is China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) designed to link 
China to Europe both by land and by sea. The BRI is probably the most 
                                               
1  John Springford and Christian Odendahl, “Trump, trade and the EU: Two wrongs don’t 
make a right,” CER insight, (February 2017), accessed August 25, 2019, https://www.cer.eu/ 
insights/trump-trade-and-eu-two-wrongs-dont-make-right.  
2  Ian Bond, “The EU, The Eurasian Economic Union and One Belt, One Road: Can they 
work together,” Centre for European Reform, (March 2017): 3. 
3  Dmitri Trenin, The Ukraine Crisis and The Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry 
(Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2014): 20. 
4  Joan DeBardeleben, “Revising the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy: The Eastern 
Partnership and Russia,” in Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Roger E. 
Kanet (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 247. 
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ambitious and attractive project which pursues to include many countries and 
delivers investment and development in the region providing economic benefits 
for its participants. Russia pursues a strategic partnership with China while 
working together on the ‘New Silk Road’ project even though their interests are 
not identical.
5
 
Nowadays with growing US protectionism and uncertainties in the 
transatlantic relationship it is time for the EU to diversify its external ties and 
look for other allies that share the idea of free trade gains and have a common 
interest in maintaining the international rules-based trading system. The current 
EU’s Trade and Investment Strategy published in 2015 implicitly lays out a 
“Pivot to Asia” and in this context the EU has already concluded (with 
Singapore, Vietnam, Japan) or is negotiating free trade and investment 
agreements with a number of Asian countries.
6
 However, a missing 
geographical link in the relations between the EU and Asia is a closer 
cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union.  
 It should be stressed that regardless of the import-substitution policy that 
Russia is trying to pursue in order to move away from gas and oil dependence
7
 
it has well realized that real economic diversification could only be achieved if 
supported industries are export-oriented. Thus the EEU is searching for trade 
partners actively promoting free trade agreements (FTAs). Such FTAs have 
already been signed with Vietnam and Iran while with Israel, India and 
Singapore are under negotiation. In this regard, the EU and the EEU may join 
their efforts for protecting FTAs, globalization and multilateral bodies in order 
to counterweight the US new administration policy of protectionism. While 
FTA between the EU and the EEU themselves seems quite unrealistic at the 
moment due to the EU-Russian tension, it should not be rejected right away. 
Despite some differences in political systems and values there are shared 
economic interests for both entities that make finding common approaches 
worth the effort instead of passively observing as the existing order is replaced 
by something much more hostile to the EU’s values and interests.
8
 The 
European Commission (2015) also acknowledges that the EU’s strategic interest 
is to achieve closer economic ties with Russia (accordingly the EEU), though 
that depends on domestic and foreign policy developments which so far give no 
signs of the necessary changes.
9
 
                                               
5  Bond, The EU, 1. 
6  Cora Jungbluth, “Trump & Brexit - European-Asian Economic Relations under New 
Conditions”, (GED Focus Paper, Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2017): 6. 
7  Richard Connolly and Philip Hanson, “Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in 
Russia,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham house research paper, June 
2016): 2. 
8  Bond, The EU, 13. 
9  European Commission, “Trade for all – towards more responsible trade and investment 
policy” (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, October, 2015): 34, 
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The main obstacle for EU-EEU rapprochement is undoubtedly the 
situation in Ukraine and the sanctions between the EU and Russia. However, we 
argue that the step-by-step economic cooperation between the two blocs first 
can mitigate the political confrontation and second may become the platform for 
deeper collaboration when the crisis in Ukraine is resolved. Thus, in order to 
develop a vision of the future bilateral relations it would be useful to understand 
the potential effects of signing an FTA. The present study does not downgrade 
political factors but refrains from politicization and focuses on the economic 
issues of possible EU-EEU cooperation. The main aim is to examine the 
potential effects on the economic welfare of possible trade liberalization 
between the EEU and EU. 
The first part of the article provides a literature review with a twofold 
purpose – to describe the EEU as a regional integration bloc and to present the 
bilateral economic relations of the EEU with the EU. The second part exhibits 
the methodology of analysis which involves calculation of trade indicators 
based on the Sussex Framework. Finally, the results of the analysis are 
discussed outlining the prospects of future economic relations between the EU 
and the EEU. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature review consists of two parts. In the first part the EEU is 
analysed as a new regional project within the post-Soviet space in order to 
present a common view of this nascent organization. In the second part EEU’s 
foreign economic activities are studied with a particular focus on obstacles and 
possibilities for EU-EEU cooperation.  
 
 
Eurasian Economic Union as a Regional Economic 
Integration Project 
 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union several attempts have been 
made to implement a project of regional organization in the post-Soviet space. 
However, speaking of integration in the post-Soviet era, it is worth highlighting 
that a great many academics
10
 have come to the conclusion that although the 
                                                                                                                   
accessed August 25, 2019, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_ 
153846.pdf. 
10  Anastassia Obydenkova, “Multi-Level Governance in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Problems and 
Promises,” in Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, eds. Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti 
and Michael Zürn (January 2010): 292-308; Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov, 
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integration existed on paper, in reality it did not possess any political or 
economic clout. Even perhaps the most famous organization in the post-Soviet 
space, that being the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has managed 
merely to ensure a ‘civilized divorce’.
11
 The failure can be partly explained by 
the fact that Russia – as well as other nascent post-Soviet states – after being 
economically destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, had to focus on 
solving their own domestic problems rather than to opt for precarious and costly 
integration projects at that time. Kirkham (2016) argues that stripped of any 
substantial financial resources these counties saw Western economies as future 
investors and, therefore, Eurasian integration was not economically prioritised.
12
  
Nevertheless, Russia had not totally abandoned the idea of reintegration 
into post-Soviet space, and as a result, on the basis of previous integration 
projects, the Eurasian Economic Union was created. The idea of a Eurasian 
Union with a clear focus on economic matters came from Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
13
 and, consequently, the 
project was borrowed by Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, as a “model of 
a powerful, supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles of 
the modern world” and a bridge “between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific 
Region.”
14
 In October 2007 the “Troika” (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) — 
the three countries that represent the kernel of the regional integration — signed 
the Agreement on the establishment of a customs union (CU). The Common 
Customs Tariff went into force in 2010.
15
 Thus the CU can be considered as the 
EEU’s predecessor. Subsequently, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the 
organization in 2015. However, according to Vinokurov (2017), the EEU is still 
best viewed as a functioning customs union with a rich additional agenda.
16
 
                                                                                                                   
Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), accessed August 25, 2019, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/61646/. 
11  The term was applied by Putin at a Conference in 2005 during which he stated that unlike 
the European countries, which worked together for integration in the format of the EU, the 
CIS was established with the only purpose of ensuring a ‘civilized divorce’ of the Soviet 
Union. 
12  Ksenia Kirkham, “The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union: How successful is the 
Russian regional hegemony?,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, Issue 2 (July 2016): 116. 
13  The speech was given in March 1994 at Moscow State University. 
14  Putin’s words cited in Golam Mostafa, “The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian 
policy and its implications,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4, Issue 2, (July 2013): 162. 
15  The evolution of Eurasian integration is described in more detail in the following surveys: 
Libman and Vinokurov, Holding-Together Regionalism; Pablo Podadera Rivera and Anna 
Garashchuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union: prospective regional integration in the post-
Soviet space or just geopolitical project?,” Eastern Journal of European Studies 7, Issue 2, 
(December 2016): 91-110. 
16  Evgeny Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results,” 
Russian Journal of Economics 3, Issue 1 (2017): 69. 
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The EEU does not seem to have been welcomed by Western countries. 
For the West the EEU looks like a neo-imperialist project promoted by Russia 
with a view to reviving its splendour of a Great Empire.
17
 Thus, Bond (2017) 
highlights that the EU has taken a largely negative approach to the EEU which 
it sees through the prism of Russia’s political ambitions.
18
 It is worth 
mentioning that many authors
19
 concur in their opinions considering the EEU 
more as a geopolitical project rather than an economic one. However, Vasileva 
(2017) highlights that the EEU’s institutions lack a political mandate making 
the EEU a harmless project.
20
 Kirkham (2016) stresses that Russia has always 
been treated with suspicion by the West, which proceeded with its institutional 
development against rather than with Russia and as a result it was excluded de 
facto from the institutional expansion both from a political-economic (the IMF 
and the World Bank) and military (NATO’s operational activities and border 
expansion) point of view. In this regard the author strongly believes that Europe 
left the Russian Federation with no alternative other than a reintegration project 
with the post-Soviet states.
21
 
The EEU nonetheless is the most ambitious
22
 and the only functioning 
project with supranational bodies for deep integration in the post-Soviet space. 
                                               
17  Lilia Shevtsova, “The Return of Personalized Power,” Journal of Democracy 20, Issue 2 
(April 2009): 61–65; Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (Washington, DC, 2011): 1-194; Andrei Tsygankov, Russia and the 
West from Alexander to Putin: Honour in international relations (Cambridge/ New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012; Marcel M. Van Herpen, Putin’s wars: The rise of 
Russia’s new imperialism (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, February, 2014): 
1-296. 
18  Bond, The EU, 8. 
19  Paul Kubicek, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Example of Failed 
Regionalism?,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, (February 2009): 237-256; 
Trenin, Post-Imperium; Carol R. Savietz, “The Ties That Bind? Russia’s Evolving 
Relations with Its Neighbors,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 45 (2012): 
401-412; Andrey Zagorski, “Caught between the Economy and Geopolitics,” in Analyses 
and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 4-7; Dossym Satpayev, “Kazakhstan: 
Economic Integration Without Relinquishing Sovereignty,” in The Eurasian Economic 
Union. Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, eds. Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 11-14; Arseniy Sivickiy, 
“Belarus: Muted Integration Euphoria,” in Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, 
(February 2015): 15-18; Alexandra Vasileva, Why the European Union Should Talk with 
the Eurasian Economic Union? (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2017): 1-10; 
Podadera and Garashchuk “The Eurasian Economic Union.” 
20  Vasileva, Why the EU Should Talk, 4. 
21  Kirkham, “The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union”, 121. 
22  Christopher Hartwell, “A Eurasian (Or a Soviet) Union? Consequences of Further 
Economic Integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” Business Horizons 
56, Issue 4, (2013): 411-420; Elena Kuzmina, “Expansion and Free Trade,” in The 
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However, the formation of a common identity is the cornerstone on which 
depends the ultimate success of the regional integration project. Taking into 
consideration that the members of the EEU might not have lost their Soviet 
character entirely, these old ties should help to re-establish a Eurasian identity. 
Nonetheless, researchers argue that the former connections will disappear in 
time, and the leftover states will become part of either Europe or the Islamic 
world
23
 for the simple reason that increased integration with the EU would be 
more advantageous than joining Russia to form post-Soviet independent 
states.
24
 Moreover, Kirkham (2016) emphasizes that some of these inherited 
Soviet values have a negative impact on the current political systems of the 
post-Soviet states, resulting in bureaucratic inflexibility, non-market driven 
ways of doing business, corruption and monopolisation of strategic industries. 
She also suggests that the EEU authorities should work diligently for the 
construction of a common identity by launching cultural projects in order to 
battle Russo-phobia.
25
  
With regard to the methodology, Dragneva and Wolczuk (2013),
26
 to cite 
two examples, have attempted to apply a neo-institutional and neo-functional 
approach to analysing the financial benefits that the EEU would bring to its 
member-states. Kirkham (2016) has pioneered in applying the neo-Gramscian 
approach to analysing the potential for the EEU as a Russian counter-
hegemonic initiative that presupposes the analysis of four core elements: the 
institutional design, the capitalist system, geopolitics and cultural leadership, 
delivering the results via SWOT-analysis. Nevertheless, the lack of empirical 
evidence, due to the fact that the EEU is an infant project, seems to be the main 
shortcoming uncovered in recent research.  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
Eurasian Economic Union Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Russia, eds. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Felix Hett and Susanne Szkola, (February 2015): 8-
10; Zagorski, “Caught between the Economy and Geopolitics.” 
23  Abbott Gleason, “Eurasia: What Is It?” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, No. 1 (January 
2010): 26-32; Aleksey Malashenko, “Zametki o prostranstve, imenuemom postsovetskim, 
i o tom, chto tam delaet Rossiya,” (Notes on the space called post-Soviet and what Russia 
is doing there). Druzhba Narodov, no 9, (2011): 135-152; Andrei Tsygankov, “The 
Heartland No More: Russia’s Weakness and Eurasia’s Meltdown,” Journal of Eurasian 
Studies 3, Issue 1 (January 2012): 1-9. 
24  Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Guicci, Quantitative Assessment of Ukraine’s Regional 
Integration Options: DCFTA with European Union vs. Customs Union with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan (Mimeo, German Advisory Group, Institute for Economic Research and Policy 
Consulting, November 2011): 1-13, accessed August 25, 2019, https://www.beratergruppe-
ukraine.de/download/Beraterpapiere/2011/PP_05_2011_en.pdf.  
25  Kirkham, “The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union,” 123. 
26  Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, Eurasian economic integration: Law, policy and 
politics (Cheltenham, UK, and Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013), 1-225. 
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Obstacles and Possibilities for EU-EEU cooperation 
 
Despite being an ambitious regional integration project the EEU is too 
small to become a self-sufficient market. In this regard Vinokurov (2017) 
highlights that any attempts to erect an “Eurasian fortress” are suicidal.
27
 The 
EEU is actively searching for partners via building up a network of free trade 
areas (FTAs) with large trade partners. Thus, the EEU has already signed FTAs 
with Vietnam and Iran, while those with Israel, India and Singapore are under 
negotiation. Karaganov et al. (2015) argue that cooperation with China is 
crucial for the EEU which will provide powerful impetus to regional 
development in Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East.
28
 In this regard, the EEU 
and China have signed a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement hand in 
hand with the involvement of each in China’s new strategic concept — the Silk 
Road Economic Belt. Although the cooperation between the EU and the EEU is 
currently obstructed by a profound crisis in EU-Russian relationships, according 
to Vinokurov and Libman (2012) long-term sustainable development of the 
EEU is only possible if it relies on close cooperation not only with China but 
with the EU as well.
29
 In spite of the fact that simultaneous membership in the 
EEU and an FTA with the EU is technically impossible due to the fact that 
member-states of both custom unions cannot have bilateral trade relations with 
other partners Vasileva (2017) argues that economic cooperation between the 
EU and the EEU is still possible on a union level and can be achieved by low-
ering trade barriers, harmonizing standards and creating a common free trade area.
30
 
Although there have been no official talks between the EU and the EEU 
or any engagement above the level of technical standard harmonization 
Vasileva (2017) thinks that the EU-EEU dialogue could be a first small step 
towards solving some more complicated political crises in Europe and 
contribution to establishing a common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eura-
sian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
31
 Bond 
(2017) points out that European Commission officials do not want to give the 
EEU legitimacy by dealing with it formally (as Russia would like), so they limit 
themselves to informal contacts. But within those limitations, there is still some 
progress, for instance in harmonising EU and EEU standards.
32
  
                                               
27  Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union,” 66.  
28  Sergey Karaganov et al., “Toward the Great Ocean: Creating Central Eurasia. The Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the priorities of the Eurasian states’ joint development ,” (Moscow: Valdai 
Discussion Club, June 2015): 4-23, accessed August 25, 2019,  http://karaganov.ru/content/ 
images/uploaded/a7a117d7310c6e15bf14bf0f6d2f56ae.pdf. 
29  Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman, Eurasian integration: Challenges of 
transcontinental regionalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1-230. 
30  Vasileva, Why the EU Should Talk, 1. 
31  Ibid., 7. 
32  Bond, The EU, 8. 
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Vasileva (2017) argues that the Eurasian Economic Union (and the 
Eurasian Economic Commission in particular) is a suitable channel for dialogue 
since it is a multilateral economic organization.
33
 According to Bond (2017) the 
fact that the EEU is institutionally limited to the economic sphere and that the 
BRI is primarily a project for regional cooperation makes it easier to justify 
practical collaboration. The author also points out that both the EU and China 
recognize that they cannot work together effectively along the Silk Road 
without taking some account of Russia and its historical links in the region.
34
 
Moreover the fact that the sanctions between the EU and Russia have not been 
escalated to the level of the EEU can become some kind of ‘bridge’ in 
improving relationships and contributing to economic rapprochement between 
the two unions. Vinokurov (2018) proposed a possible ‘mega-deal’ between the 
EU and the EEU, involving trade agreements, removal of non-tariff barriers, the 
creation of integrated electricity markets and visa liberalization.
35
 Nevertheless 
Bond (2017) argues that it is better to start with more realistic expectations 
promoting gradual economic rapprochement. With this regard he opines that the 
EU should work quietly and incrementally with the Eurasian Economic 
Commission, relevant Chinese agencies and the countries along the routes of 
the Silk Road Belt with a view to facilitate trade across the whole region, 
aiming gradually to reduce tariffs and remove non-tariff barriers, and to 
promote transparency, good governance and the rule of law, initially at least 
limited to the commercial sphere.
36
  
It is worth mentioning that EEU member-states show a vivid interest in 
cooperating with the EU. Thus, Kazakhstan signed the Enhanced Partnership 
and Co-operation Agreement with the EU in December 2015. Armenia signed 
the specially designed Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement 
with the EU in November 2017. Moldova is a member of the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) that recently became an observer to 
the EEU. Bond (2017) highlights that some EEU member states like Belarus 
and Kazakhstan prefer bilateral negotiations with the EU. In this regard the 
author points out that despite all foreseeable difficulties the EU should make the 
effort to reach out to the members of the EEU and China.
37
 De Jong (2016) 
argues that Russia’s economic downturn eroded the EEU’s attractiveness as a 
motor for economic integration and growing disillusionment on the part of the 
individual EEU members about the union should mean that there will be more 
willingness on their part to pursue a distinctly multi-vector foreign policy that 
                                               
33  Vasileva, Why the EU Should Talk, 3. 
34  Bond, The EU, 8. 
35  Evgeny Vinokurov, Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018): 128. 
36  Bond, The EU, the Eurasian Economic Union and One Belt, One Road, 9. 
37  Ibid., 13. 
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seeks greater cooperation both with the EU and with China.
38
 However, we 
argue that the promotion of bilateral relations with individual members of the 
EEU without considering the interests of Russia can provoke more conflicts and 
instability both within the union and in the region obliging countries to decide 
either to cooperate with the EU or with the EEU. In this regard for economic 
rapprochement with the EU it would be better to use a multilateral platform via 
the Eurasian Economic Commission.  
It is noteworthy that according to Russia’s 2016 foreign policy strategy 
creation of a common economic space between the EU and the EEU is one of 
the strategic priorities in the relations with the EU while for the EU the 
cooperation between two unions is conditional on the implementation of the 
Minsk II agreement. Nevertheless, the sanctions and the situation in Ukraine 
probably is the main but far from the only obstacle for rapprochement between 
the EU and the EEU. First of all, at the beginning the EU has taken a negative 
approach to the EEU which is sees through the prism of Russia’s political 
ambitions, and in this regard, it would be difficult to get rid of these stereotypes. 
Second, the blocs have different political regimes and values. And finally, it 
should not be forgotten that substantial economic asymmetries between both 
parties exist. Thus, the EU’s GDP is almost 5 times higher than EEU’s GDP 
(current US $, PPP) and EU’s GDP per capita exceeds 1.6 times those of the 
EEU (see Figure 1).  
Because of these economic asymmetries, closer cooperation might not 
bring equal gains for every country and the inflow of more competitive goods 
from Europe to the EEU market will challenge some industries and lead to their 
restructuring. According to a study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
the long-term economic benefits of an EU-EEU FTA would outweigh potential 
negative transitional costs but economic transition should be effectively 
managed in order to achieve popular political support for the agreement. The 
author suggests two potentially complementary approaches to smooth the 
transition. First, trade barriers should be removed to sectors with comparative 
advantage while for the rest this should happen subsequently and gradually. 
Second, programmes providing technical and financial support should be 
implemented by the participating states including some assistance from the EU 
for the poorest countries.
39
 In this regard, this contribution aims to estimate the 
economic possibilities for the cooperation by using the methodology of Sussex 
Framework which is described in detail under a later heading. 
 
                                               
38  Sijbren De Jong, “The Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union Geopolitics, 
Geo-Economics and Opportunities for Europe,” European Policy Analysis, no. 11 
(September 2016): 9. 
39  Christian Bluth, “Free Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok - A Tool for Peace and 
Prosperity: The Effects of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the Eurasian Region,” 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, GED Studies, (2016): 13. 
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Methodology 
 
Various methods are used by economists to analyse effects of Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs) defined as reciprocal trade agreements between two 
or more partners including FTAs and Customs Unions. Some of them are 
simple and based on trade indicators while others are more complex and include 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) or partial equilibrium (PE) market 
simulation models, and econometric analysis. The latter are very useful but have 
a number of limitations for policymakers. Simulation models require a high 
level of expertise and are very demanding in terms of data requirements. Cross-
country econometric models have been useful in testing hypotheses about 
causal relationships, including links to policy changes in the past, but do not 
provide enough structural detail to support analysis of the impact of, for 
example, a given RTA.
40
 Therefore, we are going to use trade indicators which 
are very informative and provide for a preliminary ascertainment of the pros and 
cons of taking part in an RTA, which can be discussed at the initial negotiations.
41
 
Since RTAs are a second-best solution to universal trade liberalization as 
they involve the removal of trade barriers between participating countries but 
discrimination against non-members, their effects on welfare could be 
ambiguous. This is traditionally analysed through the concepts of trade creation 
and trade diversion put forward by J. Viner (1950).
42
 Trade creation arises when 
more efficiently produced imported goods from new partner countries replace 
less efficient domestically produced goods which increases welfare. There is 
trade diversion when sources of supply shift from more efficient non-partner 
countries to less efficient partner countries which involves a welfare loss. 
Whether an RTA is net welfare increasing or decreasing depends on the relative 
strengths of these two effects and requires empirical analysis to identify the 
outcome. There are a number of “rules of thumb” that help evaluate this net 
welfare impact: 
- the higher are the initial tariffs between the trading partners, the 
greater is the likelihood of both trade creation and trade diversion; 
                                               
40  David Evans et al., Assessing Regional Trade Agreements with Developing Countries: 
Shallow and Deep Integration, Trade, Productivity, and Economic Performance (CARIS, 
University of Sussex, Study for DFID, 2007): 2. 
41  Evgeny Vinokurov et al., “EU-EAEU Potential Economic Integration: Methodological 
Approaches to the Assessment of Economic Impact”, IIASA project “Challenges and 
opportunities of economic integration within a wider European and Eurasian space” 
(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2016): 5. 
42  Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1950): 1-221. 
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- the greater the number of RTA partners the more likely it is that 
there will be overlaps with cost differences, and therefore the greater 
the likelihood of trade creation; 
- the wider the difference in comparative advantages between 
countries and the higher the initial share of trade between them, the 
more likely the trade agreement will be welfare improving; 
- the more similar is the product mix in the partner countries, the more 
likely it is that there will be trade creation because there is more 
scope for specialization; 
- the higher the percentage of trade with potential partners, the greater 
the possibility that the RTA will be welfare increasing.
43
 
The “Sussex Framework” developed at the University of Sussex 
represents an analytical template to identify the central questions in considering 
the potential benefits of a proposed RTA. Within the Framework a range of 
diagnostic indicators (grounded in economic theory and related to the rules of 
thumb) are used to shed light directly and indirectly on the welfare 
consequences of a given RTA. These indicators focus mostly on elements of 
shallow integration (shallow, or negative, integration involves the removal of 
border barriers to trade, typically tariffs and quotas) but also on deep integration 
(deep, or positive, integration involves policies and institutions that facilitate 
trade by reducing or eliminating regulatory and behind-the-border impediments 
to trade). They reflect the current state of knowledge in economics about 
facilitating economic integration. The value-added from the Framework arises 
from putting together existing knowledge in a coherent package, identifying and 
explaining the relevance of particular statistical indicators.
44
 The steps for 
analysing are as follows: 
- interpretation of tariff barriers; 
- analysis of export and import dynamics; 
- analysis of geographical distribution of trade; 
- analysis of sectoral composition of trade; 
- analysis of comparative advantages; 
- analysis of export similarity; 
- analysis of the possibility for deep integration: intra-industry trade. 
The indicators used in the analysis process are provided in Table1 (see 
Annexes). The Framework, the usefulness of the diagnostic indicators and the 
rules of thumb have been put to empirical validation against more sophisticated 
                                               
43  Maryla Maliszewska et. al., Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and 
Implications of a Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Georgia, 
(Center for Social and Economic Research, Network Reports no. 79, ISBN 978-83-7178-
457-6, 2008):31; UNCTAD, “Regional Trading Agreements, Virtual Institute Teaching 
Material” (NY and Geneva, 2010): 22-23. 
44  Evans et al., Assessing Regional Trade Agreements with Developing Countries, 2. 
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and resource-intensive analytical methods, notably general equilibrium and 
partial equilibrium modelling. Overall the Sussex Framework gives very similar 
predictions of the likely economic effects with the considerable added 
advantage of working at a much more detailed sectoral and geographical level.
45
  
 
 
Results 
 
In this contribution the possible welfare impacts of regional trade 
agreement between the EU and the EEU is analysed. The period is from 2010 
(when the Common Customs Tariff went into force between Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia) till 2017. The analysis is presented under the following 
headings.  
  
 
Tariff analysis 
 
As a first step in assessing the possible effects of signing an RTA is 
looking at the average tariff rates of the parties under analysis. As the first rule 
of thumb suggests, the higher the initial tariffs, the higher the possible effects on 
both trade creation and trade diversion after those barriers are removed under 
the new preferential regime. 
Since the Customs Union is at the foundations of the Eurasian economic 
integration and there is a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) in effect we are going 
to use data for Russia’s MFN applied tariffs as a very close approximation of 
the tariffs applied by the EEU (they are not yet unified as the CCT does not 
cover all goods generally due to various obligations of the member states to the 
WTO). 
Russia’s accession to the WTO in 2012 has led to several rounds of 
declining CCT rates.
46
 From Table 2 we can ascertain that by 2018 the MFN 
tariffs applied by Russia are already low and comparable to the ones applied by 
the EU. We can therefore infer that a future reduction of tariff barriers under a 
potential EU-EEU FTA is expected to have limited scope for either trade 
creation or trade diversion, especially when it comes to non-agricultural 
products.  
It should be added that certain product groups still enjoy high tariff 
protection within the EEU. Besides agricultural products like meat, beverages 
and sugars, these are: arms and ammunition (16% equivalent ad valorem tariff), 
articles of leather (13%), vehicles (12%), furniture (12%) and ceramic products 
                                               
45  UNCTAD, “Regional Trading Agreements,” 170. 
46  Vinokurov, Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union, 68. 
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(11%).
47
 They are going to experience downsizing effects after trade 
liberalization and some transitional period should be stipulated, especially in the 
case of the automotive industry.  
 
 
Export-Import Dynamics and Geographical Distribution 
 
The analysis of parties’ export and import is the first step to explore 
whether the EU and the EEU are “natural” trading partners. Although it is 
important to capture export-import structures for a longer time so as to discern 
the natural evolution of trade, in our case the period is limited by the fact the 
EEU is a young organization. It should not be forgotten that till 2015 the EEU 
did not exist, however, there was its predecessor - the Customs Union between 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The evolution of export-import of EEU’s 
export and import with the EU is shown in Figure 2. 
From 2010 till 2013 there was a significant growth both in EEU’s import 
and export to the EU. However, after 2013 there was a sharp decline in bilateral 
trade due to stagnation and further recession of Russian economy in general, 
sanctions between the EU and Russia and low oil prices (the largest economies 
of the EEU – Russia and Kazakhstan – are strongly depended on oil prices). It is 
worth mentioning that as Russia represents 86% of EEU’s GDP, the EEU 
reflects above all the economic situation in Russia. Nevertheless, in 2018 a 
significant increase both in export and import (especially export) can be 
observed. 
  As for the trade balance, the EEU traditionally exports to the EU much 
more goods than imports from it and constantly registers a merchandise trade 
surplus. All in all, it should be recognized that despite the crisis in Russian-EU 
relations the strong trade interdependence between the two unions continues 
being very significant. The EU depends on raw materials from Russia and 
Kazakhstan while EEU member-states are depended on investment and 
consumer goods from the EU. However, both parties try to diminish this 
interdependency by diversification of their suppliers.  
The openness index is indicative of an outwardly oriented economy. The 
openness index both for the EEU and the EU is shown in Figure 3. It should be 
noticed that from the beginning when the Common Customs Tariff went into 
force the Openness Index was not high especially compared with the EU and 
stood at 55%. In 2014 there was a strong decline of the Openness Index in the 
EEU due to economic difficulties within the union. In 2017 the Openness Index 
stood at 37.5% what is more than two times less than the EU’s Index.  
                                               
47  According to data from the International Trade Center, accessed August 25, 2019, 
www.trademap.org. 
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The analysis of export-import structures by main trading partners is one 
of the most important steps of the “Sussex Framework”. Forming an RTA with 
a partner with which the country currently does little trade suggests there may 
be limited scope for expansion. The EEU’s partners’ distribution is shown in 
Figure 4.  
Observing Figure 4 it can be said that the EU is the main trade partner for 
the EEU, even though by 2017 its share decreased by 5 p.p. in import and by 6 
p.p. in export comparing with 2010 due to economic difficulties in the EEU 
(especially in Russia), sanctions and low oil prices. On the other hand, China’s 
share increased by 5 p.p. both in import and export structures. As for Ukraine, 
despite the crisis with Russia, the country continues being dependent on EEU’s 
raw materials even though its share declined by 1 p.p. in EEU’s export 
structure. However, the import from Ukraine declined significantly and while 
being the third biggest importer in 2010 it is not among the EEU’s main five 
import partners anymore. Thus, if the EEU and the EU were integrated the 
countries on the post-Soviet space would not be obliged to choose between the 
two unions and would not have to incur economic losses due to the reorientation 
of trade. Surprisingly, in spite of the political crisis between Russia and the 
West, the USA’s share in the EEU import increased by 1 p.p.  
Based on the Sussex Framework, given the important position and still high 
though declining weight of the EU both as an import and export partner of the EEU, 
we can expect that there are opportunities for further expansion of exports in both 
directions if barriers to trade between the two partners are reduced. 
 
 
Analysis of sectoral composition of trade 
 
Following the Sussex Framework, it is important to consider the sectoral 
pattern of trade as it can help identify the sectoral distribution of likely trade 
creation and trade diversion and also those sectors which are of particular 
importance to the economies concerned. This has both economic significance 
and is also important from a political economy perspective.
48
 
When analysing the commodity trade structure three years’ averages were 
chosen to better identify trends in trade and get over short term factors such as 
economic fluctuations, price volatility, change in stock levels, weather 
conditions, etc.
49
  
                                               
48  UNCTAD, “Regional Trading Agreements,” 147. 
49  Paskal Zhelev and Zoya Podoa, “Bulgarian-Russian Bilateral trade relations: Current State and 
Prospects,” Evolution of International Trading System: Prospects and Challenges, St. 
Petersburg: Skifiya-print (2013):154, accessed August 25, 2019, http://worldec.ru/ 
content/conference/october%202013/Issue-2013%20(this%20year).pdf#page=151 
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Table 3 allows us to identify the EEU’s main sectors and to see how its 
export structures towards the EU evolve and to compare it with the pattern with 
the rest of the world. It is evident that the highest importance for the EEU’s 
exports both to the EU and to the world have primary commodities and in 
particular fuels. In 2015-17 almost 3/4
th
 of EEU’s exports to the EU consisted 
of fuels while the equivalent share to the world was by 16 p.p. lower. Altogether 
the EEU exports a higher proportion of manufactured goods to the world than to 
the EU. Throughout the analysed period there is a positive trend of a declining 
share of primary goods in EEU’s exports but this is mainly due to lower world 
prices of commodities. Generally, the EEU remains highly dependent on the 
exports of natural resource-intensive goods.  
When it comes to imports a reverse picture is observed. The EEU imports 
mostly manufactured goods from the EU. In 2015-17 their share was almost 90%, 
around 12 p.p. higher than the correspondent share of manufactured imports from 
the world. Trade creation and trade diversion are likely to be concentrated in these 
product areas but given the already low tariff rates for these products the magnitude 
of the welfare effects is not going to be high. 
 
 
Analysis of revealed comparative advantages 
 
Traditional trade theory stipulates that gains from trade arise from 
specialization in products in which countries possess comparative advantages. 
According to the Sussex Framework the wider the differences in comparative 
advantages between partner countries the larger the possible gains from a future 
RTA as it enables the partners to source the products from the most efficient 
supplier.  
In Tables 6 and 7 we have ranked the products with the highest share of 
EEU’s exports to the EU and the EU’s exports to the EEU respectively and we 
have calculated the RCA index to determine whether both partners are 
exporting products with a comparative advantage in their bilateral trade. We 
observe the following: 
- the EEU and the EU have specialized in entirely different product 
groups in their trade relations; 
- just the top two EEU’s products make up the striking 67% of the 
exports to the EU, while the EU’s exports to the EEU is much more 
diversified as the top 10 products account for 30%; 
- except fertilizers all EEU’s top export products are in the group of 
resource-intensive manufactures (petroleum oils and metals) while 
all leading products exported from the EU to the EEU are mostly 
technology-intensive (machinery and transportation equipment and 
chemicals); 
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- all of the top 10 products exported from the EEU to the EU exhibit 
comparative advantage on the world market (in five of the cases it is 
strongly pronounced – RCA>4); 
- except for telecommunications equipment (here we might expect 
trade diversion after a possible RTA) all other leading EU export 
items to the EEU have comparative advantage though in most cases 
it is weak (RCA<2).  
Based on the above we might expect a welfare-improving impact of a 
possible EEU-EU RTA. However, as tariffs are already low these effects have 
already been to a large scale exhausted. 
 
 
Analysis of export similarity 
 
According to the Sussex Framework an RTA is welfare improving when 
the potential partner countries have differing comparative advantages but 
produce similar mix of goods before integration, and as a result of the process 
of integration they are then able to source the good from a more efficient partner 
supplier.  
 We measure the export similarity based on the F-K index, with values 
of 0 indicating completely different export structures and values of 1 (or 100 if 
expressed as %) – identical export specialization. The results show that the 
export similarity between the EEU and the EU is very low albeit increasing 
from 21.5% in 2010 to 28.5% in 2017. Here we should take into account that 
given the higher degree of aggregation (3-digit level) the values of the index 
tend to be overrated in comparison with calculation at a more disaggregated 
level. The lowest is the export similarity with the EU of Kazakhstan – just 
13.5% in 2017, while the highest resemblance exhibits Belarus – it has over 
40% overlap with the export profile of the EU. 
The low level of export similarity suggests that it is more likely that an 
FTA between the EEU and the EU will see relatively more trade diversion than 
trade creation as there is limited scope for further specialization but 
opportunities for import sources to be shifted. 
 
Analysis of intra-industry trade 
 
So far, we have mostly analysed the possible effects of shallow 
integration between the EEU and the EU. A key indicator within the Sussex 
Framework is the Grubel-Lloyd index that measures the intensity of intra-
industry trade currently taking place and based on that the existing and the 
potential for further deep integration.  
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 Given the low export similarity between the EU and the EEU it is no 
surprise that the bilateral IIT is also very low. In 2010 it was 6.7% and in 2017 
has increased to 10.4%. That means that almost 90% of the bilateral trade 
between the two unions is of inter-industry type, therefore providing little 
evidence of deep integration and much scope for it under current trade patterns. 
However, a potential comprehensive RTA that goes beyond free trade and 
improves the business environment for FDI may strengthen the intra-industry 
linkages. Increased FDI have the potential to foster faster technology transfer, 
productivity growth and economic catch-up.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The structure of trade between the EEU and the EU shows a high degree 
of complementarity as opposed to similarity as the EEU supplies mostly 
primary commodities while importing manufactured goods from the EU. Thus, 
the bilateral trade relations are predominantly of inter-industry type and show 
very little mutual integration into global supply chains. Having in mind the 
already low tariffs we can conclude that shallow integration effects of a possible 
EEU-EU RTA will not be significant and trade diversion is going to be more 
likely than trade creation. This is because around 62% of the EEU’s imports are 
from non-EU countries and their share has been on the upside suggesting that 
third countries are increasing their competitiveness and a possible RTA might 
drive import shifting from them, i.e. trade diversion. At the same time the low 
similarity of the export profiles and different comparative advantages suggest 
little possibility for trade creation, i.e. shifting local production to more efficient 
RTA partners. On the other hand, the small overlap of export structures hints 
that both parties have different offensive and defensive interests that should 
make trade negotiations of a free trade agreement easier. Notwithstanding this, 
there still will be some economic restructuring with the automotive sector being 
the biggest winner in the EU and the biggest loser in the EEU and an adequate 
mitigating strategy addressing it should be envisioned.  
It should be stressed that the current analysis is static and does not 
include the dynamic effects of RTAs. However, the dynamic effects could be 
much more important as they bring technological diffusion, pro-competitive 
gains from higher import competition, economies of scale and learning by doing 
efficiency gains, increased FDI, positive externalities arising from institutional 
changes, etc. Therefore, a potential RTA between the EEU and the EU should 
try to trigger the dynamic effects of regional economic integration and has to 
involve more than mere tariff elimination. Going beyond shallow integration 
such an agreement will have to cover reduction of non-tariff barriers, technical 
regulation, trade in services, freedom of capital movement, competition rules, 
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protection of intellectual property rights, dispute settlement mechanism, access 
to public procurement, trans-border infrastructure and environmental issues.  
Being geographical neighbours and natural trading partners that have 
already engaged in a sizeable amount of trade, both the EEU and the EU have a 
mutual interest in pursuing greater trade cooperation. The EU is interested in 
having secure supplies at lower prices of raw materials and other inputs and 
easy access to markets with high potential and size. The EEU is also interested 
in having better market access and stable demand for its products and in getting 
investments, technology and knowledge transfers. Third countries like Ukraine, 
Georgia, Moldova, Serbia which trade intensively both with the EU and the 
EEU will also gain from free trade agreement between them as they will not 
have to sacrifice preferential trade relations with one of the unions in order to 
get such relations with the other. For the global economy such an RTA could 
mean a resolute opposition to protectionism and support of a multilateral trade 
system based on rules. 
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Annexes 
 
 
Figure 1. EU vs. EEU 
Source: elaborated on the basis of data from the WB Development indicators for 2017 and images 
taken from China Briefing, Dezan Shira & Associates and Copyright & Disclaimer imagen, 
accessed August 25, 2019, https://media5.picsearch.com/is?MjfTLrfx3B0zLvLvmsiyK_cXq 
TM69XMKD89rQCZhfjc&height=272. 
 
Table 1. Main Indicators for the Analysis 
Indicator Formula Interpretation 
Openness  
           
     
    
 
The subscript j represents the 
country being analyzed, X are 
exports, M are imports and GDP is 
the real GDP. 
The openness index measures 
countries' exposure to 
international trade. A higher 
openness index is indicative of an 
outwardly oriented economy. 
Revealed 
comparative 
advantage 
(RCA) index 
      
   
   
 
   
   
 
where Xij and Xwj, are values of 
country i’s and world exports of 
product j, respectively; 
Xit and Xwt are values of country i’s 
total exports and world total exports, 
respectively. 
This index is used for calculating 
the relative advantage or 
disadvantage of a certain country 
in a certain class of products. An 
RCA greater than 1 will imply 
that the given country has a 
comparative advantage. 
 
Finger-Kreinin 
index of export 
similarity 
FKij    
 
 
 ∑        ∑          
       ∑         
 
Xik is country i’s exports of product 
k 
Xjk is country j’s exports of product 
k 
 
It tells how similar two partners’ 
export profiles are. It ranges in 
value from 0 = totally different to 
1 = totally similar. 
Grubel-Lloyd 
index 
         
           
           
 
This index measures the overlap 
of imports and exports at a given 
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Xijk is exports from country i to 
country j of commodity k, and M 
corresponds to imports with the 
same subscript. k is defined at the 
level of aggregation. 
 
aggregation level. It varies 
between 0 and 1, and higher 
values indicate a higher level of 
intra-industry trade (IIT). If GLijk 
= 0, there is no IIT, only inter-
industry trade. This would mean 
that the country (group of 
countries) in consideration either 
only exports or only imports good 
k. 
 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sussex Framework. 
 
Table 2. Yearly averages of MFN tariffs applied by the Russian Federation and the 
EU (%) 
  2010 2012 2014 2016 2017 2018 
Russia All products 12.4 12.2 8.9 5.2 4.9 4.8 
Agricultural 32.1 36.3 20.8 15.2 13.2 13.8 
Non-agricultural 11 10.7 8.1 4.5 4.3 4.2 
EU All products 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Agricultural 13.8 14.3 18.1 14 13.2 14.2 
Non-agricultural 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Source: ITC Market Access Map data. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of the EEU’s (Customs Union’s till 2015) export and import with the EU 
(billion $) 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of ITC Trade Map data. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of EU’s and EEU’s (Customs U 
nion’s till 2015) Openness Index (%) 
Source: Calculated on the basis of World Bank Data. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of EEU’s (Custms Union’s till 2015) Export and Import (%) 
Source: Calculated on the basis on ITC Trade Map data. 
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Table 3. Structure of EEU’s exports to the EU and the world (2010-2017, %) 
 Product group / Period 
  
2010-2012 av. 2015-2017 av. 
EU world EU world 
 Primary commodities 90.3 83.1 86.7 76.7 
 All food items 0.7 3.2 1.5 6.7 
 Agricultural raw materials 1.3 1.8 1.5 2.3 
 Ores and metals 4.9 6.3 6.9 7.5 
 Fuels 82.3 70.8 74.6 58.3 
 Manufactured goods 9.7 16.9 13.3 23.3 
 Chemical products 3.4 5.4 4.2 6.7 
 Machinery and transport equipment 1.2 3.6 2.8 5.9 
 Other manufactured goods 5.1 7.9 6.4 10.6 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data. 
 
Table 4. Structure of EEU’s imports from the EU and the world (2010-2017, %) 
 Product group / Period 
  
2010-2012 av. 2015-2017 av. 
EU world EU World 
 Primary commodities 12.5 22.8 10.4 21.9 
 All food items 9.7 12.6 7.6 13.0 
 Agricultural raw materials 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 
 Ores and metals 0.8 2.2 0.8 2.4 
 Fuels 1.0 7.0 0.8 5.4 
 Manufactured goods 87.5 77.2 89.6 78.1 
 Chemical products 17.9 11.7 22.3 13.7 
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 Machinery and transport equipment 47.2 40.1 43.7 37.0 
 Other manufactured goods 22.3 25.4 23.6 27.3 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data. 
 
Table 5. Similarity of the export profiles of the EEU and its member states with the EU 
(2010-2017, %) 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EEU 21.5 22.3 26.8 27.3 26.3 27.0 27.4 28.5 
Armenia 16.9 25.2 24.4 18.4 16.6 17.8 17.8 18.1 
Belarus 37.0 35.1 35.5 39.9 38.6 37.2 41.0 40.3 
Kazakhstan 12.0 12.4 14.1 14.4 14.6 13.9 13.8 13.5 
Kyrgyzstan 21.8 27.0 29.0 29.8 30.3 26.4 29.5 27.2 
Russia 19.1 19.8 24.6 25.7 24.6 25.0 24.5 26.2 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD 3-digit SITC data 
Table 6. Comparative advantages of EEU’s products with the highest share in exports 
to the EU (2015-17 av.) 
SITC 
code 
Product description Share in EEU’s 
exports to the EU 
(%) 
RCA 
eeu 
333 Petroleum oils, oils from bitumin. materials, crude 43.2 5.8 
334 Petroleum oils or bituminous minerals > 70 % oil 23.9 4.4 
321 Coal, whether or not pulverized, not agglomerated 2.2 2.2 
682 Copper 2.1 2.5 
667 Pearls, precious & semi-precious stones 1.6 1.3 
684 Aluminium 1.3 2.5 
562 Fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 1.3 8.0 
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671 Pig iron & spiegeleisen, sponge iron, powder  1.0 6.7 
681 Silver, platinum, other metals of the platinum group 0.9 3.0 
672 Ingots, primary forms, of iron or steel; semi-finis. 0.9 9.8 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data. 
 
Table 7. Comparative advantages of EU’s products with the highest share in imports 
into the EEU (2015-17 av.) 
SITC 
code 
Product description Share in EEU’s 
imports from the 
EU (%) 
RCA 
eu 
542 Medicaments (incl. veterinary medicaments) 6.1 2.0 
781 Motor vehicles for the transport of persons 6.0 1.6 
784 Parts & accessories of vehicles of 722, 781, 782, 783 4.1 1.4 
764 Telecommunication equipment, n.e.s.; & parts, n.e.s. 2.7 0.5 
728 Other machinery for particular industries, n.e.s. 2.5 1.2 
741 Heating & cooling equipment & parts thereof, n.e.s. 2.0 1.2 
553 Perfumery, cosmetics or toilet prepar. (excl. soaps) 1.8 1.6 
723 Civil engineering & contractors' plant & equipment 1.7 1.1 
743 Pumps (excl. liquid), gas compressors & fans; centr. 1.6 1.4 
772 Apparatus for electrical circuits; board, panels 1.6 1.0 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD data. 
 
Table 8. Intra-industry trade of the EEU and its member states with the EU (2010-
2017, %) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EEU 6.7 7.1 7.6 6.6 8.0 10.6 9.3 10.4 
Armenia 12.6 9.9 10.8 9.1 11.8 14.4 11.5 9.4 
Belarus 14.6 11.4 10.0 11.8 12.8 15.6 18.9 16.3 
Kazakhstan 1.3 1.5 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.0 
Kyrgyzstan 5.8 6.0 4.5 5.0 8.4 8.4 9.1 4.9 
Russia 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.6 7.8 9.6 8.8 10.7 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD 3-digit SITC data. 
